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the "package deal" might be movable defective items worthy of the
warranty's protection. Thus, mobility is at best an artificial test. It is
submitted that a builder's liability should not turn on whether a de-
fective item can or cannot be removed. Aside from these points, the
Gable decision must be viewed as a major stride away from caveat
emptor and toward increased consumer protection.
MARGARITA EsQuIRoz
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: NO LONGER AN
ABSOLUTE BAR
The plaintiff, a widow, was the devisee of a life estate in certain
commercial property owned by her husband, the testator. The will
provided that their son, who was designated as the remainderman in fee,
could occupy the premises as his residence and for business purposes for
the duration of the plaintiff's life term, provided he pay $80.00 rental
per month to the plaintiff.' The plaintiff's son, his wife and, later, a corpo-
ration they formed (the defendants), occupied the premises from 1953
(the year the testator died) until 1970, but they never paid any rent to
the plaintiff during that time. The plaintiff brought an action in equity
for a declaratory decree construing the will, and for the recovery of the
17 years rent that she contended was owed to her. The defendants raised
the defenses of the statute of limitations, laches, waiver and estoppel. The
trial court held that plaintiff had a valid life estate and was entitled to
all the past due rental payments. On appeal to the District Court of
Appeal of Florida, Third District, held, affirmed: A court of equity will
not rigidly follow the statute of limitations where the equities are un-
equal; thus, plaintiff's life estate claim for rental was not barred by the
passage of time, nor by waiver or estoppel. Tower v. Moskowitz, 262
So.2d 276 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
1. The relevant portions of the will are as follows:
"I. I do hereby give, devise and bequeath my real properties located at 2195 and
2197 N.W. Seventh Avenue, Miami, Florida, and all my real property on N.W.
22nd Street, Miami, Florida, to my beloved wife, ETHEL MOSKOWITZ, for
life, but upon her death or remarriage, the said properties shall go to my beloved son,
MARTIN TOWER, in fee."
"V. It is my desire and wish and I do hereby direct that my son, MARTIN
TOWER, shall have the right to occupy as his home the premises which he now
occupies over the store premises at 2195 N.W. Seventh Avenue, Miami, Florida,
and also have possession of the store premises at 2195 N.W. Seventh Avenue,
Miami, Florida, which he presently occupies, both for the sole consideration of
Eighty ($80.00) Dollars per month as rental for the both said premises as long
as he shall desire, it being understood, however, that the said MARTIN TOWER
shall also be required to pay all real estate taxes that may become due on said
premises during the time he occupies the same."
Tower v. Moskowitz, 262 So.2d 276, 277 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
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It is clear that the defense of laches is one that is addressed largely
to the discretion of the trial court.' Mere lapse of time does not, of itself,
constitute laches;3 rather, the applicability of the defense is primarily a
question of fact to be determined from the circumstances of the particular
claim involved.4
While it is true that a statute of limitation may be employed as a
guide in an equity action in connection with the defense of laches,
technically, a plea of bar by the statute of limitations is not a proper
defense in an equitable proceeding.' Equity is not absolutely bound to
apply a statute of limitation." However, it will apply the statute of limita-
tions with the same substantial construction and effect as it would receive
in a court of law, "unless strong equities compelling the application of a
different rule are made to appear ..."I
The elements necessary to establish laches as a bar to relief are: (1)
conduct by the defendant giving rise to the situation of which complaint
is made; (2) failure of the plaintiff to assert his rights by suit, although
he has knowledge of the defendant's conduct and has the opportunity to
institute a suit; (3) defendant's lack of knowledge that the plaintiff will
assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to
the defendant in the event that the suit is not barred.' In Tower, the
plaintiff-widow did not sue to enforce her rights until seventeen years
after the right on which she based her suit accrued. In addition, there
was a dispute as to whether the defendants had knowledge that the plain-
tiff would assert her right to the rental payments. Thus, the defendants
had apparently satisfied the necessary requirements to establish laches
as a bar to relief, yet the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to all
of the back rent.
The underlying justification for the court's decision stems from the
idea that
the bar of laches will not be raised solely because of the passage
of time. Further, the doctrine of laches is the vehicle by which
equity will follow the law and apply the statute of limitations.
However, equity will not rigidly follow the statute of limitations
where the equities are unequal.1°
2. Powell v. Key West, 434 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1970).
3. Wiggins v. Lykes Bros., 97 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1957).
4. Glades County v. Green, 154 So.2d 320 (Fla. 1963).
5. Reed v. Fain, 145 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1961); see H. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 28, at 74-75 (2d ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited as MCCLINTOCK].
6. H.K.L. Realty Corp. v. Kirtley, 74 So.2d 876 (Fla. 1954); Cook v. Central & S. Fla.
Flood Control Dist., 114 So.2d 691 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959); see also 30A C.J.S. Equity § 131
(1965) ; see generally MCCLINTOCK, supra note 5, §-28, at 74-75.
7. Wadlington v. Edwards, 92 So.2d 629 (Fla. 1957); see also 30A C.J.S. Equity § 131
(1965); MCCLINTOCK, supra note 5, § 28, at 74-75.
8. H.K.L. Realty Corp. v. Kirtley, 74 So.2d 876, 878 (Fla. 1954); see also 30A C.J.S.
Equity § 131 (1965) ; see generally MCCLINTOCK supra note 5, § 27, at 69-71.
9. Van Meter v. Kelsey, 91 So.2d 327, 330-31 (Fla. 1956).
10. 262 So.2d at 279 (emphasis added).
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Laches is an affirmative defense, and one element that must be estab-
lished is that the delay in bringing suit results in prejudice or injury to
the party asserting the defense as a bar."
In the instant case, the defendants argued that the statute of limita-
tions to be applied was three years in an action for money damages for
back rent, based on Florida Statutes section 95.11.12 Thus, the plaintiff's
claim, stale for seventeen years, should have been barred by time. How-
ever, the court stated that "a suit for declaratory decree was cognizable
by law or equity, and the choice would depend upon the subject matter
[of the suit] .""1 Based on the plaintiff's request for construction of the
will, 4 the court characterized the plaintiff's suit as properly cognizable
in equity.'5
It is a well-established principle of law that one who seeks equity
must do equity, and must come into equity with clean hands.'6 Since the
instant suit was properly brought in equity, the court used this equitable
maxim to justify its decision not to rigidly follow the statute of limita-
tions. The defendant-son had failed to pay the plaintiff, an 80-year-old
widow, any rent for the use of the premises of a thriving business, even
though the will bound the son to pay her the fixed and obviously small
sum of eighty dollars per month. Clearly, the defendants had been un-
justly enriched and the bar of laches "certainly could not be available to
those who [have been] unjustly enriched .... "17
In the final analysis, it was the overwhelming equitable considera-
tions in favor of the plaintiff-widow that motivated the court in the
instant case to decide that the statute of limitations was inapplicable.
Unless the interests of innocent third parties are involved, "[t]he so-
called equitable maxim that 'equity follows the law' is invoked only in
cases wherein the equities are equal."' 8
The Tower case, with its potentially sweeping effect, has created a
precarious situation for the practicing attorney. The manifest, inherent
weakness of the decision is that it fails to establish any standards (i.e.,
a "test" to be applied in all or most situations) or guidelines as to what
facts must be presented for the court to find that the equities are "suffi-
11. Florida Power Corp. v. McNeely, 125 So.2d 311 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960); see also 30A
C.J.S. Equity § 118 (1965) ; McCLINTOCK, supra note 5, § 28, at 71.
12. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(5) (e) (1971), which provides that actions other than those for
the recovery of real property can be commenced only within three years.
13. 262 So.2d at 278, citing Coast City Coaches, Inc. v. Whyte, 102 So.2d 848, 851
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
14. Such requested action is authorized by Florida's Declaratory Judgment Act. FLA.
STAT. § 86.021 (1971).
15. The court based this decision on the authority of Roberts v. Mosely, 100 Fla. 267,
129 So. 835 (1930).
16. Taylor v. Rawlins, 90 Fla. 621, 106 So. 424 (1925) ; Jackson v. Singer, 221 So.2d 783
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1969) ; see also 30 C.J.S. Equity §§ 93-99 (1965) ; MCCLINTOCK, supra note 5,
§ 26.
17. Smith v. Winter Haven, 154 Fla. 439, 441, 18 So.2d 4, 6 (1944).
18. Reed v. Fain, 145 So.2d 858, 868 (Fla. 1961) (footnote omitted) ; see also 30 C.J.S.
Equity § 103 (1965) ; MCCL TOCK, supra note 5, § 27, at 69.
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ciently unequal" to warrant disregarding the analogous statute of limita-
tions. Apparently, the court in the case at bar was motivated by several
equitable considerations, to wit: the age of the plaintiff-widow; her need
for the funds; the unjust enrichment enjoyed by the defendants; and the
position of power in the corporation occupied by the plaintiff's daughter-
in-law, who dominated the family finances, coupled with her apparent
abuse of this power in refusing to compensate the plaintiff. However, the
court failed to indicate which, if any, of these factors it considered
determinative in reaching its decision.
The impact of the decision in Tower is clear. The statute of limita-
tions can no longer be considered as an absolute bar to an action merely
because of the passage of time. Where a legal action is barred by the
applicable statute of limitation, but might have been brought either in
law or in equity, the alert attorney can circumvent the bar of the statute
by stating an equitable cause of action, assuming that the equities are
''sufficiently unequal" to justify disregarding the statute of limitations.
STEPHEN G. FISCHER
ATTORNEY'S FEE EARNED PRIOR TO TESTIMONY
Plaintiff-attorney, upon learning that he would be required as a
material witness on behalf of his client, withdrew from the case, and
the remainder of the trial was conducted by defendant-attorney. At the
trial, portions of plaintiff's testimony supported his ex-client's contentions,
other portions did not, and much of his testimony was cumulative. Plain-
tiff sought recovery from defendant of the portion of the contingent fee
which the plaintiff had earned prior to his withdrawal from the case.
The trial court found that there had been an implied agreement between
plaintiff and defendant that each would share in the fee and that plaintiff,
prior to his withdrawal, had performed twenty percent of the total legal
services; but the court ruled that plaintiff was precluded by the Code
of Professional Responsibility from sharing in the contingent fee. The
District Court of Appeal, First District, affirmed on appeal.' The Supreme
Court of Florida, on conflict certiorari review, held, reversed: Absent
bad faith or coloring of testimony affecting the outcome of the litigation,
an attorney who withdraws from a case to become a material witness is
entitled to the reasonable fee which he earned prior to the time he realized
or should have realized the need for his testimony. Hill v. Douglass,
271 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1972).
The ethical requirement that an attorney withdraw from the trial
of a case when he learns or reasonably should have learned that he will
1. Hill v. Douglass, 248 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
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